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Abstract. Monero is a privacy-centric cryptocurrency that makes pay-
ments untraceable by adding decoys to every real input spent in a trans-
action. Two studies from 2017 found methods to distinguish decoys from
real inputs, which enabled traceability for a majority of transactions.
Since then, a number protocol changes have been introduced, but their
effectiveness has not yet been reassessed. Furthermore, little is known
about traceability of Monero transactions across hard fork chains. We
formalize a new method for tracing Monero transactions, which is based
on analyzing currency hard forks. We use that method to perform a
(passive) traceability analysis on data from the Monero, MoneroV and
Monero Original blockchains and find that only a small amount of inputs
are traceable. We then use the results to estimate the effectiveness of
known heuristics for recent transactions and find that they do not signifi-
cantly outperform random guessing. Our findings suggest that Monero is
currently mostly immune to known passive attack vectors and resistant
to tracking and tracing methods applied to other cryptocurrencies.
1 Introduction
Monero is a privacy-enhancing cryptocurrency that exceeds others (Zcash, Dash)
in terms of market capitalization and promises privacy and anonymity through
unlinkable and untraceable transactions. It thereby addresses a central shortcoming
of well-established currencies such as Bitcoin, which cannot offer a meaningful level
of anonymity because transactions sent to addresses are linkable and payments
among pseudonymous addresses are traceable. There are now a number of
commercial (e.g., Chainalysis) and non-commercial tools [1,2] that implement
well-known analytics techniques (c.f., [4]) and provide cryptocurrency analytics
features, including tracking and tracing of payments made in cryptocurrencies.
Technically, Monero is based on the CryptoNote protocol and aims to address
Bitcoin’s privacy issues using three central methods: Stealth addresses, which
are one-time keys that are generated from the recipient’s address and a random
value, should prevent the identification of transactions sent to a given address
and provide unlinkability. The use of Ring Signatures in Monero transactions,
which mixes an output that is spent (real input) with other decoy outputs (mixin
input), obscures the path of a given coin and provide untraceability of payments.
Finally, Confidential Transactions hide the value of non-mining transactions and
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should prevent tracing by value and guessing of change addresses, which are used
to send excess input funds back to the issuer of the transaction, based on values.
Nevertheless, in 2017, two concurrent studies [3,5] have shown that untrace-
ability can be compromised by applying heuristics that can identify mixins. They
were able to trace the majority of transactions up to the introduction of RingCTs
(confidential transactions) in Jan. 2017. In the following releases (Sep. 2017
and Mar. 2018), additional improvements such as a higher mandatory minimal
ringsize and an improved sampling technique for decoys were rolled out. The 2017
studies already showed that the share of traceable transactions plummeted after
the introduction of RingCTs, but a more up-to-date picture on the effectiveness
of those improvements is still missing.
Furthermore, another traceability method that exploits information leaked
by currency hard forks (a split of the currency with a shared history; unspent
pre-fork TXOs can be spent on both post-fork branches) has been discussed
in the community for some time. The general idea of the attack vector is to
exploit differences between rings spending the same output on the two post-fork
branches. However, we are not aware of a formal description, nor of an evaluation
of its effectiveness.
The contributions of this work are twofold: first, in Section 3, we propose and
formalize a new Monero cross-chain analysis method, which exploits information
leaked by currency hard forks. Second, in Section 4, we empirically analyze
Monero cross-chain traceability by combining known heuristics with our new
method. Our analysis, which considers Monero blocks 0 to 1 651 346 (2018-08-31),
also provides an up-to-date assessment on the effectiveness of the previously
mentioned countermeasures by evaluating the accuracy of known heuristics on
recent transactions.
Our findings suggest that Monero is currently mostly immune to known
passive attack vectors and resistant to established tracking and tracing methods
applied to other cryptocurrencies. They also confirm that the changes to the
protocol, which were introduced as countermeasures to the heuristics proposed
by Kumar et al. [3] and Möser et al. [5], were effective. Consequently, this implies
that currently available cryptocurrency analytics tools that work for Bitcoin and
its derivatives cannot be applied for tracking and tracing of Monero payments.
All the analysis done in this work can be reproduced by using the MONitERO
toolchain, which can be found on GitHub3
2 Known Monero Traceability Methods
Currently we are not aware of any known method to compromise confidential
transactions and stealth addresses. Untraceability has been successfully dimin-
ished by Kumar et al. and Möser et al. with the following approaches:
Zero Mixin Removal (ZMR) [3,5] As each ring has exactly one real member, all
rings with only one (non-mixin) member can be traced, just like in Bitcoin. As
3 https://github.com/oerpli/MONitERO
the referenced outputs can only be spent once, occurrences of these outputs in
other rings can be marked as mixins. Repeated applications of this rule is called
Zero Mixin Removal (ZMR). If the average ringsize is small enough, repeated
applications of this rule can result in a chain reaction. To prevent this, the
mandatory minimum ringsize has been increased several times (0→3 in 2016,
3→5 in 2017 and 5→7 in 2018). In October 2018 (after the cutoff of our dataset)
the ringsize has been increased (from 7→11) and removed as parameter, i.e.
all transactions issued since v0.13 have a fixed ringsize of 11. This removes a
possible attack vector, based on the assumption that transaction with certain
nonstandard ringsizes are issued by the same (set of) users. In our analysis we
did not find a method to exploit this.
Intersection Removal (IR) [5] This heuristic is a generalization of ZMR: If N
rings contain the same N (non-mixin) members, it is (usually) impossible to
determine, which output has been spent in which ring, but as all of them are spent
in one of the rings, we mark them as spent and other references to these outputs
as mixin. If N = 1, this method is identical to ZMR. This can be generalized
even further: Instead of N identical rings with N members we look for sets S
of rings (where each ring is a set of transaction outputs, abbreviated as TXOs)
with the property: |S| = ∣∣⋃r∈S r∣∣ (if there are n sets in S, the union of those sets
contain n elements). This maps to the matching problem for bipartite graphs
G = (V1, V2, E), where the property |S| ≤ |N(S)| (where N(x) is the set of
neighbors of x) holds ∀S : S ⊆ V1 iff there is a perfect matching.
Guess Newest Heuristic [3,5] While the outputs spent in a transaction are
(mostly) fixed, the choice of decoys is somewhat arbitrary. Most Monero TXOs
are spent a few days after they’ve been received (resulting in an age distribution
of the real inputs that is heavily left-skewed). The mixins on the other hand were
initially (until v0.9 in 2016) sampled uniformly from all eligible existing outputs.
Starting from January 2016, a triangular distribution was used (according to
Möser et al. [5], which still wasn’t sufficiently left-skewed and did not match
real spending behavior), from December 2016 on, ≈25% of the inputs where
sampled from the recent zone (outputs less than 5 days old). In September 2017,
two changes have been made to the sampling from the recent zone. The recent
zone has been reduced to outputs less than 1.8 days old and the number of
decoys sampled from the recent zone has been increased to 50%4. In October
2018 (v0.13) the sampling method has been changed to a gamma distribution.
The two publications from April 2017 (shortly after the introduction of the recent
zone sampling), proposed a simple yet highly effective heuristic, which guessed
that the real input is the most recent one.
Output Merging Heuristic [3] If multiple inputs of a transaction reference distinct
outputs from the same transaction, this heuristic assumes that these outputs are
the real inputs. Before the introduction of confidential transactions this arose
4 https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/1996/files
naturally, as outputs where split up into denominations (e.g. an output of 8XMR
would have been split up into three outputs with denominations 1,2 and 5 XMR).
If the recipient wants to spend his funds, he would have to merge these outputs.
While this heuristic also works for confidential transactions, these TXs tend to
have fewer outputs (mostly 2 outputs, one of which is the change output), which
results in fewer “merging-transactions”.
3 Hard Forks & Cross Chain Analysis
0 1 . . . n
n+
1 n+ 2
. . .
n+ 1
n+ 2 n+ 3 n+ 4 . . .
Fig. 1: Illustration of a currency hard fork. The blocks between the genesis block
(0) and the fork height (n) are shared. Unspent outputs from pre-fork TXs can
be spent on both branches.
Like software projects, cryptocurrencies and their blockchains can be forked,
resulting in two currencies with a partly shared transaction history. There are
different forking mechanisms, though for this work only hard forks (see Fig. 1)
are relevant. The important aspect for our method is that unspent pre-fork TXOs
can be spent on both branches. To prevent double spending, each (input) ring is
published with a key image, which is uniquely determined by the spent output
(the ring signature is used to verify that this is the case). If a coin is spent in
multiple (one per branch) rings after a fork, the real input has to be in the
intersection of the rings and the remaining members, i.e. the pairwise symmetric
differences, can be marked as mixins, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
4 Results
We used the methods from Kumar et al. and Möser et al. that do not produce
false positives (Zero Mixin Removal & Intersection Removal) as well as our new
method (Cross Chain Analysis) to deduce mixins and real inputs for Monero
transactions. We focus on nontrivial rings, i.e. rings that have at least one mixin
(ringsize > 1). If some of the ring members are identified as mixin, we refer to
the remaining number of possible real inputs as effective ringsize. A ring with
an effective ringsize of 1 is traced. Statistics from our dataset can be found in
Table 1.
Overall, were able to trace 4 212 422 nontrivial rings. As can be seen in Fig. 3,
in the first years of Monero’s existence most nontrivial rings where traceable (as
most mixins were spent in trivial rings). To prevent this, mandatory minimum
ringsizes have been introduced, though the sampling of older, provably spent
0:{b c} 1:{b c} 2:{a b c} 3:{a d e f} 4:{v w x}
4:{x y z }3:{a e f g}
. . .
Fig. 2: An illustration of the Monero blockchain( XMR ) and a fork of it ( XMO ), two
blocks before and the first two blocks after a fork. Each block contains one ring
(format: "〈KeyImg (0-9)〉{〈ring members (a-z)〉}"). The first two rings (0,1) have
the same two members, i.e. intersection removal can be applied to mark these
inputs (b, c) as mixin (black) in ring 2, leaving only input a, which is therefore the
real (green) input. From the two rings with KeyImg 3, input a can be therefore
removed as it is spent. Additionally, d and g can also be ruled out as they are
not part of the intersection {a, d, e, f}∩{a, e, f, g}. The intersection of the two
rings with KeyImg 4 consists of only one element, x, which must therefore be
the real input.
outputs as mixins remained a problem. Starting from 2017, the introduction
of RingCT mostly eliminates this threat, as RingCT transactions only sample
outputs from other RingCT transactions, all of which were issued after the
introduction of mandatory minimum ringsizes.
In the weeks following the MoneroV and Monero Original hard forks, the
fraction of traceable rings increases. This is due to our newly proposed method,
which allows us to identify the real spent output of 73 321 (improved from 25 256)
out of 1 565 858 transaction inputs in the 685 608 (non-coinbase) transactions that
have been issued between 2018-04-01 and 2018-08-31. The number of identified
mixins in this time span has also more than doubled, from 203 251 to 544 131.
Taken together, the status (real or mixin) of 617 452 out of 11 826 525 ring members
in this time frame has been identified, which amounts to 5.22% (compared to
228 507 and 1.93% without cross-chain analysis). Results from our traceability
analysis can be found in Table 2.
Using the results from our traceability analysis, we also investigated the
accuracy of the guess newest heuristic (GNH) and the output merging heuristic
(OMH) for recent transactions (see Table 3). We find that the performance of the
GNH (see Fig. 4) is not better than random guessing for recent transactions. For
the OMH (see Fig. 5) we used two different methods to aggregate the data by
months, once considering the time where the outputs were created (“Out”) and
when they where spent (“In”). Overall, the number of true and false positives
is identical, though the distributions over time differ somewhat. A problem of
the OMH is the fact that RingCT transactions have fewer inputs and outputs,
resulting in less transactions that merge outputs from previous transactions and
thus less possible applications of the OMH.
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Fig. 3: Bar chart of monthly number of nontrivial rings (NTR, > 1 member).
Shaded bars represent traced rings. Traceability plummets after introduction of
RingCT, small peak after hard forks in Spring 2018 due to cross-chain analysis.
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Fig. 4: Performance of GNH over time: After January 2017 the number of
identified mixins and real inputs plummet and the accuracy is estimated based
on a small sample. (Estimated) accuracy plummets for recent transactions.
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Fig. 5: Performance of OMH over time: Outputs are created at time out
and spent at time in. Left bar for each month uses out-time for aggregation, right
bar uses in.
Table 1: Dataset statistics: As the Monero (XMR), MoneroV (XMV) and
Monero Original (XMO) blockchains share some parts, the values from the two
forks (XMV & XMO) only refer to data unique to their blockchain. “Last block”
refers to the last block used for the analysis in this work.
XMR XMO XMV
First TX date 2014-04-18 2018-04-06 2018-05-03
Last TX date 2018-08-31 2018-08-31 2018-08-31
First block 1 1 546 600 1 564 966
Last block 1 651 346 1 651 728 1 647 778
# Transactions 4 955 908 146 475 146 215
# Coinbase TXs 1 651 347 105 729 82 814
# TX outputs 28 878 846 198 618 450 773
# Rings (TX inputs) 24 760 168 244 965 212 919
# Nontrivial rings 12 538 632 241 464 212 919
# Ring members 70 767 723 1 243 479 1 701 036
Table 2: Traceability results: Overall results for Monero and its two forks as
well as results for recent Monero TXs. Ringmembers are spent if they have been
found in an intersection set (i.e. spent but it is not known in which TX)
XMR XMO XMV
# Nontrivial rings 12 538 632 241 464 212 919
# Ring members 70 767 723 1 243 479 1 701 036
# Traced nontrivial rings 4 212 422 50 861 7 671
# Identified mixin ringmembers 16 270 257 230 128 49 035
# Identified real ringmembers 16 433 958 54 362 7 671
# Identified spent ringmembers 13 240 0 0
Table 3: XMR Traceability results for recent TXs: Subset of the XMR
dataset from Table 2 restricted to TXs between 2018-04-01 and 2018-08-31.
XMR
# Nontrivial rings 1 565 858
# Identified real rm. w/o new method 25 256
# Identified real rm. with new method 73 321
# Identified mixin rm. w/o new method 203 251
# Identified mixin rm. with new method 544 131
5 Discussion
Before mandatory minimum ringsizes were introduced, most rings were trace-
able. With increasing mandatory minimum ringsizes (2016/09) the percentage
of traceable NTR dropped and since the introduction of RingCT (2017) only a
small fraction of all transactions can be traced with blockchain analysis tech-
niques. While our newly proposed method enables the tracing of some additional
transaction inputs, the overall impact from this attack vector seems to be small
so far. This could change when a Monero fork with considerably higher traction
is launched, which would presumably result in more redeemed outputs. Using
the traced rings we looked at the accuracy of the GNH & OMH and found that
their performance suffered from the recent changes to the transaction protocol.
Though it may be the case that our analysis underestimates the accuracy of the
GNH, as most of the traced rings in recent months were traced with our new
method, which identifies the real spent pre-fork output in post-fork transactions.
This skews the age of the spent outputs compared to regular usage. Overall, the
fraction of traceable rings remains low and we believe that unless additional
attack vectors emerge, Monero remains resistant to analysis methods which have
been applied to other cryptocurrencies.
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